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Abstract 
With the steady melting of Arctic ice, the door has opened to northern shipping routes and access to 
Arctic oil reserves. As a result, the Russian Federation has jumped at the chance to control as much of 
the Far North as possible, aggressively militarizing Cold-War-Era bases and staking claims of vast 
maritime territory. With all of these recent developments, the political climate at the top of the world is 
changing dramatically. How is Russia flexing its muscles to control Arctic natural resources and what 
does this mean for the national security interests of the United States? This study will examine the 
institutions for Arctic governance and recent Russian activities--political and military-- in the Arctic 
region. It will show how Russia's bold actions in, and militarization of, the Arctic region poses a threat 
to the United States' national security interests. I will provide examples of Russian military exercises 
conducted in the region as well quantitative data showing Arctic technological and military assets. The 
analysis will explain why Russia's policy in the Arctic is aggressive and what the implications are for 
the United States and other Arctic states. 
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A Race for the Arctic 
The year 2016 has officially been the hottest year in recorded history.  Before 
2016, the record-setter had been 2015, which had beaten the record set by 2014, meaning 
that for the last three years, the temperature has gotten progressively warmer.  In fact, 16 
of the 17 hottest years have all occurred since 2000.1  It is not hard to see that the climate 
is changing.  Less snowfall and higher water levels due to melting ice caps are evidence 
of this, and this event is leading to a host of new issues for American policy makers.  
Climate change not only threatens the environment, but developments in the Arctic as a 
result of warming temperatures present dangers for the national security of states across 
the global north.   
American national security policy often centers on doing whatever possible to 
maintain state sovereignty, core values, a way of life, and institutions that define the state.  
Since the fall of the Soviet Union in the early 1990’s, however, threats to the United 
States’ national security have also come from non-state actors; in 2001, an extremist 
group that had been under the CIA’s radar for decades, al Qaeda, carried out the most 
devastating act of terror on American soil in history;2 on the United States’ southern 
border with Mexico, the number of methamphetamine and heroine seizures by US 
Customs and Border Patrol officials tripled between 2011 and 2015, the result of a 
dangerous war with drug cartels on the United States’ doorstep that has claimed the lives 
                                                          
1 Justin Gillis, “Earth Sets a Temperature Record for the Third Straight Year,” The New York Times, last 
modified January 18, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/18/science/earth-highest-temperature-
record.html. 
2 “9/11 Attacks,” History.com, http://www.history.com/topics/9-11-attacks. 
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of tens of thousands over the last decade;3 with the collapse of political, economic, and 
social stability in Syria beginning with the Arab Spring in 2011, the Syrian Civil War has 
grown in magnitude creating a power vacuum.  This power vacuum has been responsible 
for the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, another terror group which has 
carried out attacks even in American cities.4  With all of these threats, interstate conflicts 
seem to be receding, but is this the reality of today’s geopolitical environment?  Are these 
threats by non-state actors the primary threats we currently face?  No doubt, terrorist 
groups and drug cartels present a problem, but since global temperatures have been on 
the rise, American policy makers have adopted a broader view of what security means.  
With changing climates comes the reinvigoration of an old threat, a resurgent Russia.  In 
order to recognize this larger threat to our security, we must take events in the Arctic into 
account.   
The Russian Federation has been the most active nation in the Arctic in recent 
years, and Russia’s aggressive Arctic policy is cause for worry for the United States and 
other nations that hold territory above the Arctic Circle.  Russia’s assertive posture is 
causing a torrent of uncertainty and power imbalance that could result in dramatic 
consequences.  What are the implications of this Arctic race for power and how do 
Russia’s actions in the Far North pose a threat to American national security?  How is the 
United States responding to Russia’s moves in the Arctic region?  In order to properly 
examine this, I will first describe the region’s history and mechanisms that are currently 
in place to ensure Arctic governance.  Next, I will outline and analyze Russia’s active 
                                                          
3 “Ranchers fear drug cartels more than immigrants at US-Mexico border,” Financial Times, last modified 
September 6, 2016, https://www.ft.com/content/d181cc8c-765e-11e6-bf48-b372cdb1043a.  
4 “Syria’s Civil War Explained,” Al Jazeera Online, last modified Feb. 7, 2017, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/05/syria-civil-war-explained-160505084119966.html.  
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involvement in the area due to the newly-thawed maritime territory, and will provide 
specific examples of this approach.  Then, I will discuss the responses that the U.S. 
government has taken to counter Russia’s moves and join the race for control over the 
area.  Finally, I will explain how both Russia’s actions and the response from the United 
States play into U.S. national security interests, and outline the implications of a race for 
Arctic control.   
Background: History of Arctic Claims and Arctic Governance 
 The Arctic has historically been a frozen wasteland at the top of the world on the 
edge of civilization.  Within the last century however, it has become an important and 
strategic stage for procuring fossil fuels and projecting a nation’s military power due to 
increased accessibility.  As stated, actions that the Russian Federation has taken in the 
Arctic have caused controversy and sent ripples through the international community.  To 
further analyze this, we need to examine the history of Arctic claims and Arctic 
governance.  
History 
 States began to lay claim to Arctic territory around the turn of the twentieth 
century.  In February of 1907, Canadian Senator Pascal Poirier was the first legislator of 
any country to argue for sovereignty over the Arctic.  His argument was based on terms 
of longitude, and he advocated that Canada should make a “formal declaration of 
possession of the lands and islands situated in the north of the Dominion, and extending 
to the North Pole.”5  Though the first claim of its kind, other nations followed suit in 
                                                          
5 Ty McCormick, “Arctic Sovereignty: A Short History,” Foreign Policy, May 7, 2014, 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/05/07/arctic-sovereignty-a-short-history/.  
Mackowiak 4 
 
claims of the Arctic in the years following 1907.  In 1909, Robert Perry claimed the 
region for the United States.  In 1916, Norwegian coal mining company Store Norske set 
up shop in the Svalbard Islands, further legitimizing Norway’s sovereignty over this 
chain of Arctic islands.  In 1925, both Canada and the Soviet Union made formal claims 
of territory that fell within the eastern and western extremities of the nations all the way 
to the North Pole.6   
In 1937, a Soviet plane became the first to fly through the airspace over the North 
Pole, a gesture which symbolically showed Soviet mastery over the land, sea, and air of 
the Arctic.7  By this point, many Arctic nations had therefore claimed territory in the 
Arctic as their own sovereign territory based on longitudinal limits, with the North Pole 
being the furthest extent to the claim.  However, an internationally-recognized standard 
was necessary to determine what exactly constituted a state’s sovereign territory in the 
seas off of its coast.  This standard began to develop in the 1940’s.  
 On September 28, 1945, President Harry Truman claimed jurisdiction over the 
entire continental shelf off the coast of the United States.  The claim was approved by the 
United Nations in 1958 in the Convention on the Continental Shelf, otherwise known as 
the first United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I).8  Before 
UNCLOS I, the mutually-understood distance of three miles from the coast of any given 
state was considered to be the sovereign territory of that state.  The Convention 
quantified this sovereign territory as being the waters above the continental shelf off of a 
                                                          
6 Ibid.  
7 Peter Hough, International Politics of the Arctic: Coming in from the Cold (United Kingdom: Routledge, 
2013), 23, 
https://books.google.com/books?id=tZ9Mxx5SrVEC&dq=boris+yeltsin+on+expanding+into+the+arctic&s
ource=gbs_navlinks_s. 
8 Ty McCormick, “Arctic Sovereignty: A Short History,” Foreign Policy, May 7, 2014, 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/05/07/arctic-sovereignty-a-short-history/. 
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nation’s coast instead of a set distance of three miles.  UNCLOS I was the first part in 
long-standing negotiations regarding international law of maritime territorial claims.  
Two more Conventions dealing with the issue were to follow.  
 As the standard for sovereignty of the Arctic after the 1958 Convention was 
further discussed, the first disputes over Arctic territory and problems with enforcing 
Arctic sovereignty emerged.  The first of these challenges came in 1969, ironically 
caused by a U.S. oil tanker, the SS Manhattan.  The ship was the first commercial vessel 
to traverse the Northwest Passage, considered by Canada to be an internal waterway.  
This called into question the enforcement of sovereignty in the Arctic and how the 
international community would respond to possible violations of international 
agreements.  Though this event was controversial, relations between Canada and the 
United States remained favorable, a testament to the strong alliance between the two 
nations, but the Soviet Union began to look increasingly toward Arctic development.   
 The importance of the Arctic region grew for Arctic states, and as a result the 
longest-running negotiation in United Nations’ history resulted in the third Convention 
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III).  As mentioned, UNCLOS I was the first attempt at 
creating an international standard for determining maritime territory.  UNCLOS II was a 
revision of this agreement, but UNCLOS III, adopted by the United Nations in 1982, was 
the final product.  It entered into force in 1994.9  It was and remains the most 
comprehensive UN resolution concerning international maritime law. 
 The 1990’s saw the fall of the USSR, and this marked the start of the period in 
which Russian militarization in the Arctic decreased.  Under President Boris Yeltsin, 
                                                          
9 Ibid. 
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Russia experienced great decentralization from defense policy in the Far North.  Russian 
policy shifted from military-driven, to energy-driven policy during this time, moving 
toward utilization of Arctic oil and natural gas.10  In 1992, Yeltsin awarded the Gazprom 
Oil Company a grant to drill for crude oil on an Arctic archipelago, and by 2013, 
Gazprom became the first company to drill in Arctic waters.11  The project was initially 
set back by complications, but after eleven years, Gazprom rose to prominence and was 
able to develop into a profitable state-owned company.  Developments such as drilling 
for oil and natural gas in the Arctic have helped to make Russia the most active state in 
the region.   
The success of Gazprom may be due in part to now-President Vladimir Putin, 
who upon assuming office, made a drive for Russian energy security and revitalized 
Russian Arctic policy.12  More recently, Putin has taken steadily more and more actions 
in the Arctic that are aimed to help Russia’s economy boom from harvesting Arctic 
energy resources.  Putin’s actions, as we will see later, also come with significant re-
militarization of the Arctic.  
Arctic Governance 
UNCLOS III 
Now that we have discussed the history of Arctic claims, we must also take global 
governance of the Arctic into account, as this plays a large role in the current state of the 
                                                          
10 Peter Hough, International Politics of the Arctic: Coming in from the Cold (United Kingdom: Routledge, 
2013), 23, 
https://books.google.com/books?id=tZ9Mxx5SrVEC&dq=boris+yeltsin+on+expanding+into+the+arctic&s
ource=gbs_navlinks_s. 
11 Ty McCormick, “Arctic Sovereignty: A Short History,” Foreign Policy, May 7, 2014, 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/05/07/arctic-sovereignty-a-short-history/. 
12 Peter Hough, International Politics of the Arctic: Coming in from the Cold, 24.  
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Arctic.  As mentioned, there have been global agreements mostly facilitated by the 
United Nations that relate to the issue of sovereignty in the Arctic.  The 1958 Convention 
on the Continental Shelf was, as discussed, the first important step in establishing legal 
guidelines for ownership of continental shelves.  Because UNCLOS III was the most 
recent agreement to deal with this issue, the first UNCLOS is now obsolete.  UNCLOS 
III redefined and adjusted the principles laid down in UNCLOS I and II.  The treaty 
stipulates that a nation with coastline may establish a 200-mile exclusive economic zone 
off of its coast and that a 12-mile territorial sea limit would be set.13  This has special 
importance for the Arctic because of current emerging disputes over northern oil and 
natural gas fields.  Some of the clauses of UNCLOS III that are most pertinent are listed 
below: 
1. Part V, Article 55: This establishes a definition of an exclusive economic zone as 
“an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, subject to the specific legal 
regime established in this Part, under which the rights and jurisdiction of the 
coastal State and the rights and freedoms of other States are governed by the 
relevant provisions of this Convention.”14  The treaty lays out that a coastal state 
therefore has jurisdiction over the sea that borders it up until the agreed upon limit 
discussed later in the treaty. 
2. Part VI, Article 76: This clause defines “continental shelf” as being the natural 
seabed off of the coast of a state not exceeding 2,500 meters deep. It also 
                                                          
13 “The Law of the Sea Treaty (LOST) – Background,” National Center for Public Policy Research, 
http://www.unlawoftheseatreaty.org.  
14 Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, New York, 10 December 1982, 43, available 
from http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf.  
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mentions that a state may claim up to 350 miles of territory off of the state’s coast 
so long as this distance still covers the continental shelf.15  
UNCLOS III is a complex and lengthy document, defining the extent to which 
nations may develop coastline all around the world and the ways in which they may 
obtain resources from these areas.  UNCLOS III is seen as the most comprehensive 
international treaty in regards to the regulation of the seas and of territorial claims within 
them.  As we see, there are many key stipulations spelled out within the document.  The 
treaty does not stipulate, however, that a state may acquire resources from or develop 
infrastructure in an area that is not the sovereign territory of the state.  This is an issue 
that is currently facing the Arctic region with Russia.  Though UNCLOS III is an 
important document, it is not the only aspect of Arctic governance that we must discuss.  
 
The Arctic Council 
 Another important entity for Arctic governance is the Arctic Council.  This group 
of 8 states is a body tasked with the mission to regulate governmental involvement, 
ecological development, and resolving disputes in the Arctic.  The Council consists of 
Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, The Russian Federation, and the 
United States of America – the eight states that hold sovereign terrestrial territory north 
of the Arctic Circle.16  These actors are the primary decision-makers in regards to 
international law in the Arctic, but the Council also consists of six advocacy groups of 
native Arctic peoples.  These are considered “permanent participants” and they include: 
                                                          
15 Ibid, 53.  
16 The Arctic Council. “Member States.” Last modified September 10, 2015. http://www.arctic-
council.org/index.php/en/about-us/member-states. 
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Aleut International Association (AIA), Arctic Athabaskan Council (AAC), Gwich’in 
Council International (GCI), Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC), the Russian Association 
of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON), and the Saami Council (SC).17  In 
addition to the Council’s eight member states and six permanent participants, China has 
been granted observer status in the Council as of 2013.18   
 The Arctic Council’s purpose is to serve as a forum for Arctic actors to discuss 
issues that arise in the region, from the harvesting of resources to territorial disputes.  The 
Council’s website outlines its goals and duties by providing a list of the body’s working 
groups, each tasked with a certain specific issue of focus.  The organization’s list of 
groups and descriptions of what each does is listed below: 
• The Arctic Contaminants Action Program (ACAP) acts as a strengthening and 
supporting mechanism to encourage national actions to reduce emissions and 
other releases of pollutants. 
• The Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP) monitors the 
Arctic environment, ecosystems and human populations, and provides scientific 
advice to support governments as they tackle pollution and adverse effects of 
climate change. 
• The Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna Working Group 
(CAFF) addresses the conservation of Arctic biodiversity, working to ensure the 
sustainability of the Arctic’s living resources. 
                                                          
17 The Arctic Council. “Permanent Participants.” Last modified February 22, 2016. http://www.arctic-
council.org/index.php/en/about-us/permanent-participants. 
18 Ty McCormick, “Arctic Sovereignty: A Short History,” Foreign Policy, May 7, 2014, 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/05/07/arctic-sovereignty-a-short-history/. 
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• The Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response Working Group 
(EPPR) works to protect the Arctic environment from the threat or impact of an 
accidental release of pollutants or radionuclides. 
• The Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) Working Group is 
the focal point of the Arctic Council’s activities related to the protection and 
sustainable use of the Arctic marine environment. 
• The Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG) works to advance 
sustainable development in the Arctic and to improve the conditions of Arctic 
communities as a whole.19 
As we can see, the Council places a strong emphasis on sustainability and 
environmental protection of the Arctic based on the goals of each working group.  Of 
special note, however, is that the topic of military defense is not an issue that the Council 
mitigates.  This is important because it means that any military activity in the Arctic, 
even by one of the Council’s Member States, is able to go unchecked by the Council.  
This will come into play later when discussing Russian military escalation.  
The Arctic Council was established in 1996 as a result of the Ottawa Declaration.  
The forum is headed by a Chairman, a position that can only be held by one of the eight 
Arctic Member States.  The position is a two-year rotational position that follows a set 
order for chairmanship as determined by the Ottawa Declaration.20  Currently, the United 
States holds chairmanship, but its rotation is drawing to a close.  An outline of the 
Council’s chairmanship is as follows:  
                                                          
19 The Arctic Council. “The Arctic Council: A backgrounder.” Last modified May 23, 2016. 
http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us. 
20 Ibid.  
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Canada 1996-1998 
United States 1998-2000 
Finland 2000-2002 
Iceland 2002-2004 
Russia 2004-2006 
Norway 2006-2009 
Denmark 2009-2011 
Sweden 2011-2013 
Canada 2013-2015 
United States 2015-2017 
Finland 2017-2019 
Iceland 2019-2021 
Russia 2021-2023 
Norway 2023-2025 
Denmark 2025-2027 
Sweden 2027-2029 
21 
 The above table lays out the previous chairmanship of the Arctic Council as well 
as projected chairmanship.  As we can see, the rotation is based on a prescribed order of 
Member States, and that the United States’ chairmanship will conclude this year in 2017 
                                                          
21 The Arctic Council. “The Arctic Council Secretariat.” Last modified on November 4, 2016. 
http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/arctic-council/the-arctic-council-secretariat. 
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as Finland assumes the role.  The Chair of the Arctic Council is supported by the Arctic 
Council Secretariat, which previously rotated to a new location biennially.  However, in 
2006 as Norway assumed chairmanship, the Members of Norway, the Kingdom of 
Denmark, and Sweden agreed to share the Secretariat during their consecutive terms as 
Chair.  This culminated in 2011 in the creation of the Standing Arctic Council Secretariat, 
an agreement among all Member States to establish one Secretariat in Tromso, Norway to 
assist the Chair no matter which State was serving as Chairman.22  This is evidence of 
international consensus between the Member States of the Arctic Council, showing that a 
stable, consistent structure is needed to assist the Council.  
 
Assessment of UNCLOS III and the Arctic Council 
 The mechanisms in place to ensure Arctic governance are few.  We know now 
that UNCLOS III contains language which can be applied to the Arctic coast lines and 
the Arctic sea bed, and as far as international law is concerned, UNCLOS III is 
technically binding.  However, some issues arise surrounding UNCLOS III mostly 
because not all nations (including Arctic Council Members) have accepted the terms of 
the Convention.  The United States has technically not fully agreed to the treaty.  The 
U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations unanimously recommended accession to it 
in March 2004, but the entire Senate has yet to vote on the issue.23  The fact that the 
United States has not yet become party to UNCLOS III shows that the agreement may 
not be successful in establishing guidelines for states with coastal boundaries.  UNCLOS 
III is very comprehensive, but in regards to the Arctic, cannot offer a solution to 
                                                          
22 Ibid.  
23 “The Law of the Sea Treaty (LOST) – Background,” National Center for Public Policy Research. 
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territorial disputes.  With the exception of the U.S., all Arctic Council Member States 
have ratified all parts of UNCLOS III,24 showing that a consensus on this topic has yet to 
be reached by all Arctic states. 
 The Arctic Council, as mentioned, serves as an international forum used to 
discuss Arctic issues and settle disputes.  The Council resolves disputes based on 
consensus, but “its mandate explicitly excludes military security.”25  Though the Council 
has been successful in mitigating climate change and indigenous issues in the Arctic, the 
lack of a mandate to address military defense and security issues is a great detriment to 
the Council and to the overall Arctic region, as is becoming ever more apparent.  Without 
the ability to discuss military issues related to Arctic governance, the Member States of 
the Arctic Council have no way of keeping Council Members’ military activities in the 
Far North in check.  This has been noted numerous times, and recently much talk has 
centered on the idea of expanding the Arctic Council’s mandate to cover military issues.  
 The Gordon Foundation Institute of the North conducted an in-depth poll of the 
populations in all Arctic Council nations and their thoughts on specific questions related 
to Arctic issues.  The Foundation’s sample size was 10,000 people across the eight Arctic 
states.  When asked whether or not the Arctic Council should expand its mandate to 
include military security, respondents reported the following results: 26  
Russia: 76% in favor of expanding the mandate 
Finland: 71% in favor 
                                                          
24 The United Nations. “Status of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.” Last modified on 
October 10, 2014. http://www.un.org/depts/los/reference_files/status2010.pdf.  
25 The U.S. Department of State. “The Arctic Council.” Accessed on November 5, 2016. 
https://www.state.gov/e/oes/ocns/opa/arc/ac/.  
26 Walter and Duncan Gordon Foundation. “Majorities in Arctic Nations Favour Cooperation with Russia 
Despite Ukraine; See Rising Northern Military Threat.” Published April 22, 2015. 
http://gordonfoundation.ca/press-release/751.  
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Denmark: 63% in favor 
Canadian North: 57% in favor 
Canadian South: 55% in favor 
U.S. (Alaska): 56% in favor 
Sweden: 53% in favor 
U.S. South: 50% - opinions evenly distributed 
Norway: 46% in favor 
Iceland: 44% in favor 
As we can see from the data above, with the exception of those from Iceland and 
Norway, respondents favor expansion of the Arctic Council’s mandate.  Military security 
appears to be a popular topic for members of the Council.  Interestingly, respondents 
from Russia were most in favor of expanding the mandate.  This may be due to the fact 
that Russia has been the most militarily active state in the region, and opening the Arctic 
Council to discussion on military security could serve as a way for Russia to legitimize 
its aggressive behavior through dialogue with other Arctic states.  Though the Council 
cannot discuss military security at the present time, it is evident that this may change in 
the near future based on popular opinion.  Therefore, in the coming years, the Arctic 
Council’s effectiveness in mitigating possible conflict in the Arctic could improve; the 
Council’s future and that of all involved in the region appears promising.  
The Arctic has experienced a history of territorial claims mainly from the eight 
states that now control terrestrial territory in the region, and through the years much 
development has resulted from such claims.  Arctic governance by the United Nations 
has come in the form of the not-yet-fully-ratified UNCLOS III, which is legally binding, 
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but not necessarily a sustainable solution to issues in the Arctic.  The Arctic Council has 
done well, but is in need of expansion of its mandate in order to continue to be effective 
given emerging military issues in the Arctic. Now that we have observed some of the 
historical background and mechanisms of governance in the Arctic, we can now examine 
recent events of aggressive Russian territorial claims and military expansion in the area 
and how this is growing into a very large and unchecked issue for the international 
community.  
Russian Actions in the Arctic 
Policy makers have been somewhat alarmed by Russia’s aggressive expansion 
into the Arctic.  Highly valuable for more than just natural resources, the region will 
bring a plethora of benefits to Russia, but will also open up the door to future disputes 
and controversy.  The Russian Federation’s geographic location near the top of the world 
makes it easy for the nation to emerge as an important player in the region.  Russia’s 
growing Arctic hegemony has taken many forms, most notably as territorial claims, 
technological development, and militarization.  All three have increased dramatically 
since President Vladimir Putin took office.  
Territorial Claims 
 We have already discussed two important mechanisms that provide Arctic 
governance, the Arctic Council and UNCLOS III.  Both of these serve the purpose of 
ensuring that states act legally while trying to pursue their national security interests in 
the Arctic, but recently Russia’s claims of vast swaths of Arctic maritime territory have 
pushed legality to the limit and generated controversy over ownership of Arctic and near-
Arctic waters.  We must first consider Russia’s claim of the Sea of Okhotsk.   
Mackowiak 16 
 
 Off of Russia’s far-eastern coast, the Sea of Okhotsk has long been in a strategic 
location for the extraction of oil and natural gas.  In 2014, Russia submitted a proposal to 
the United Nations for ownership of the sea that was later accepted by the body.  The 
acceptance of the proposal ceded 52,000 square kilometers of the sea to Russia, allowing 
for Russia to control the entire body of water from the Russian coast to the Kuril Island 
chain, which Japan claims as well as Russia.27 This area is a rich belt of oil reserves 
which Russia will be able to use to its advantage.  The sea is famous for containing the 
“peanut hole,” an area shaped like a peanut in the center of the sea which is expected to 
yield massive oil reserves.  The Sea of Okhotsk is an example of a territorial claim by 
Russia that has been recognized at the international level and that will most likely prove 
to be a profitable move for the Federation.  However, another major claim by Russia has 
not yet been approved.  
 In 2007, Russia sent two small submersible vehicles to the North Pole.  They 
arrived with a titanium Russian flag, which a diver delivered to the bottom of the ocean, 
symbolically claiming the North Pole and therefore also a very substantial area of the 
Arctic Ocean’s seabed for the Russian Federation.28  Though a ridiculously audacious 
claim, President Putin nonetheless submitted a formal proposal concerning the claim to 
the UN.  If accepted, the claim would cede 1.2 million square miles of ocean to the 
Russian Federation.29  The map below depicts the exact area of the North Pole claim.  
                                                          
27 John R. Haines, “Ali Baba’s Cave: The Sea of Okhotsk’s Contentious Triangle,” Foreign Policy 
Research Institute (2014): 590, accessed October 28, 2015, doi: 10.1016/j.orbis.2014.08.009. 
28 McCormick, “Arctic Sovereignty.” 
29 “Russia Files Bid at UN for Vast Arctic Territory,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, last modified 
August 4, 2015, http://www.rferl.org/content/russia-un-arctic-territory/27169109.html. 
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30 
 Though it may not appear to be the case based on the map, Russia’s argument 
centers on the fact that the Russian continental shelf extends into this area and should 
therefore lawfully be allowed to serve as an exclusive economic zone for Russia in 
accordance with UNCLOS III.  There is some legitimacy to this claim, as the Lomonosov 
Ridge runs along this stretch of seabed, and can be considered an extension of Russia’s 
                                                          
30 Nicholas Breyfogle and Jeffrey Dunifon, “Russia and the Race for the Arctic,” Ohio State University 
Department of History, last modified August 2011, http://origins.osu.edu/article/russia-and-race-arctic.  
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continental shelf.31  The ridge is depicted in the map as the lighter shade of blue that 
snakes its way from the seabed off of Russia’s north-central coast, just under the “X” 
marking the North Pole, and connecting to the shelf north of Greenland.  Basing the 
claim off of the location of the Lomonosov somewhat legitimizes it, but as can be seen in 
the map, Russia’s claim encompasses an area far larger than the Lomonosov Ridge itself.  
This pushes the limits of the guidelines laid down in UNCLOS III.  The North Pole 
proposal is still an ongoing negotiation.  In addition to territorial claims, Russia has also 
undertaken aggressive technological development in the Arctic in order to project power 
and influence. 
Technological Development 
 Russia has been busy in recent years with the construction of a fleet of 
“icebreakers” and other infrastructure developments in the Arctic.  The Russian 
government currently owns and operates a fleet of over 40 icebreakers in the Arctic, 
which are specialized ships capable of carving large channels through ice fields to make 
way for smaller vessels.  The U.S. Coast Guard published a review of the number of 
icebreakers throughout the entire world in 2013.  As of that year, Russia operated 37 
fully-functional ships, with twelve more to be constructed.  A more detailed list of the 
number of icebreakers globally is presented below.  The Coast Guard’s review was not 
limited to only Arctic states, but rather encompassed every nation with such a ship.  
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We can see from the data above that in 2013, the Russian Federation owned by far 
the largest number of icebreakers in the world.  We can also see that in comparison, the 
United States only possessed three that were operational.  Also of note is that Russia was 
the only state with nuclear-powered icebreakers, which gives Russia a distinct advantage 
as the only state operating in the Arctic with such technology.  The average icebreaker 
expends 100 tons of fuel per day when working in an area with ice three meters thick.  A 
nuclear icebreaker, under the same conditions, will accomplish the same task using less 
than a pound of uranium.33  This would obviously allow Russian icebreakers to carve 
paths through the ice without having to refuel.  We can see that Russia is the dominant 
player when it comes to technological development in the Far North.  This superiority is 
only expected to increase, as Russia is currently in the process of constructing supposedly 
the largest icebreaker ship in history, which is scheduled to be completed this year.34 
Russia’s development of icebreakers is only half of the story.  Other infrastructure 
developments are underway as well.  Russia has begun modernization of a variety of 
northern facilities and is working toward constructing more deep water ports for large 
ships in northern harbors.  Typically, a port which services vessels used for commercial 
purposes is up to 20 feet deep, but a deep water port is any port deep enough to 
accommodate large, heavy-loaded ships.  This could be a depth of 30 feet or more.35  
Several of these ports already exist, and indeed, if a state controls a large area of 
                                                          
32 U.S. Naval Institute, “U.S. Coastguard’s 2013 Review of Major Icebreakers of the World,” USNI News, 
last modified July 24, 2013, https://news.usni.org/2013/07/23/u-s-coast-guards-2013-reivew-of-major-ice-
breakers-of-the-world.  
33 MI News Network, “How Does an Icebreaker Ship Work?” Marine Insight, last modified Jul. 22, 2016, 
http://www.marineinsight.com/types-of-ships/how-does-an-ice-breaker-ship-works/.  
34 Milosz Reterski, “Breaking the Ice,” Foreign Affairs, last modified December 11, 2014, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2014-12-11/breaking-ice. 
35 Soumyajit Dasgupta, “What are Deep Water Ports?” Marine Insight, last modified July 22, 2016, 
http://www.marineinsight.com/ports/what-are-deep-water-ports/.  
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coastline, it would only follow that the state develop deep water ports to service large 
vessels, thereby having the ability to import and export large quantities of goods.  
The Russian Federation currently owns and operates deep water ports all along its 
northern coastline, some of them several decades old.  Russia controls deep water ports at 
Murmansk, Pevek, Tiksi, Igarka, Dudinka, Dikson, Vitino, Arkhangelsk, and Novy.  Of 
these, Murmansk is the largest, serving as a link between European and Asian maritime 
markets.  It is also ice-free throughout the year, and is expanding its port capacity for oil 
dramatically.  By 2020, Murmansk is expected to increase its capacity by 52 million tons 
of oil per year.36  These existing deep water ports no doubt facilitate the Northern Sea 
Route with great efficiency and provide Russia with many way-stations for the Great 
Northern Fleet to use.  In addition to the aforementioned locations, it was recently 
announced that an agreement has been signed between the Arctic Transport and Industrial 
Center Archangelsk and Beijing-based Poly International Holding Co. to begin 
construction of an additional deep water port.  The port will be built near Mudyug Island, 
55 kilometers north of Archangelsk.37  The port will be placed at a very strategic location 
for Russian trade, as the resources of the Ural Mountains and Southwestern Siberia will 
be better connected to a wider global market than ever before.  This obviously offers 
serious improvements for Russian industry and transport of Arctic oil and other 
resources.  
                                                          
36 Arctis Knowledge Hub, “Arctic Ports (from AMSA Report 2009),” Arctis Knowledge Hub, last modified 
2009, http://www.arctis-search.com/Arctic+Ports.   
37 Thomas Nilson, “New mega-port in Archangelsk with Chinese investments,” The Independent Barents 
Observer, last modified October 21, 2016, https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/industry-and-
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Though not outwardly aggressive and by all accounts legal by international 
standards, Russia’s development of Arctic marine infrastructure inevitably leads to taking 
necessary precautions to preserve and protect ports.  The ports also offer the Russian 
Navy an increasing number of locations to dock heavy battleships and other military 
vessels.  A large quantity of icebreakers already puts Russia at the top of the Arctic 
hegemonic hierarchy, but there is one last, and arguably most important, aspect of Arctic 
expansion that must be discussed.  Taking territorial claims as well as recent 
infrastructure and technological developments into account, the most outwardly-
aggressive aspect of Russia’s actions at the top of the world becomes evident.   
Militarization 
 The Russian Federation has undertaken numerous military exercises in the Arctic 
in recent years, including one in particular involving over 100,000 troops.  In fact, there 
has been an upward spike in Russian military activity since roughly the end of Boris 
Yeltzin’s tenure in office.  So far, we have discussed Russia’s territorial claims and 
infrastructure development of the Arctic as having an economic benefit for Russia.  
However, Milosz Reterski of Foreign Affairs magazine sees more to the story: “Russia 
considers the Arctic a strategic priority and views its maritime territorial claims there 
through a military lens, not simply an economic one.”38  This tells us that Russia’s 
militarization of the Arctic is being done as an end in itself, and not solely to protect 
Russia’s control of Arctic resources.  If we look at all of Russia’s recent military 
developments in the Arctic, we can see that they fall into two categories: actions that are 
essentially defensive, and acts of overt aggression.  
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Defensive Militarization: 
 The Cold War caused an escalation in the development of both arms and military 
infrastructure for the West and the former Soviet Union, and the result was a host of 
Cold-War-Era bases that had no use after the disintegration of the Soviet regime.  Many 
of the bases fell into disuse and were no longer seen as important or worthy of general 
upkeep.  With the melting of Arctic ice and increased access to Arctic resources, Russia 
is opening more military bases in the Arctic, and re-opening some Cold-War Era bases. 
One such base that is being re-opened is Alakurtti, which is only 50 kilometers from the 
Finnish border. With the re-opening of this base, about 3,000 Russian troops will occupy 
the area, as well as vehicles and armor.39  The distance of Alakurtti to the West is 
warranted, considering previous discussion on deep water ports and how Russia may 
need to place military personnel near such ports to defend its claim.   
However, a few key aspects about Alakurtti raise suspicion about Russian Arctic 
expansion: Alakurtti is landlocked, and the nearest Russian deep water port to Alakurtti 
(Murmansk) is about 350 kilometers away – seven times further away from the base than 
the Finnish-Russian border.40  This makes sense in terms of defense.  If Russia is to 
prepare for an air attack on one of its key ports, it would make sense that a base be placed 
along the border with another state.  This act in itself does not constitute overt aggression.  
In fact, there are many other locations to which the Russian Federation has devoted 
modernization efforts, but the issue lies in the fact that Finland poses no major threat to 
                                                          
39 Heather A. Conley and Caroline Rohloff, New Ice Curtain: Russia’s Strategic Reach to the Arctic 
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015), 11. 
40 “Alakurtti, Murmansk Oblast, Russia,” Google Maps, accessed February 1, 2017, 
https://www.google.com/maps/dir/Alakurtti,+Murmansk+Oblast,+Russia/Murmansk,+Murmansk+Oblast,+
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the Russian Federation or the seaports located there.  The defenses at Alakurtti can be 
likened to a wartime air-defense base, one that is anticipating a large-scale attack.  Most 
importantly, Finland is not an official member of NATO.41  This means that NATO 
Member States are not legally obliged to aid Finland should Finland find itself embroiled 
in armed conflict.  Because of this, not only would it be militarily unwise for Finland to 
even consider an attack on Russia, Russia would not need to defend itself from an attack 
originating from Finland.  Therefore, one can assume that Russia has placed troops at 
Alakurtti for more nefarious purposes other than simply port defense.  Alakurtti serves 
only as one example.  We must also take the following Arctic bases into account:  
42 
                                                          
41 “NATO Member Countries,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, last modified Feb. 6, 2017, 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/nato_countries.htm.  
42 Jeremy Bender and Mike Nudelman, “This map shows Russia’s dominant militarization of the Arctic,” 
Business Insider, last modified August 7, 2015, http://www.businessinsider.com/chart-of-russias-
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 The above map shows all military bases that are either occupied or will be 
occupied by Russian forces in the coming years, and also those that are scheduled for 
modernization.  The map clearly shows a widespread increase in Arctic militarization, 
reinvigorating Cold War-Era outposts that offer strategic benefit to Russia.   
 In addition to the modernization of former Soviet bases, the Russian military has 
also stepped up the scale of military exercises in the Arctic region.  In 2014, the Russian 
military conducted the largest peacetime military exercise in its history.  The drill took 
place in the secluded Vostok region of Siberia.  Involving over 100,000 troops plus 
armor, other vehicles, and equipment, the operation was dubbed “Vostok 2014.”43  
Vostok 2014 displays a significant shift in Russian military priority, and seems to fit right 
in to the statement made by Reterski about Russia prioritizing the Arctic region as a 
military stage.  As stated, it makes sense that the Russian Federation would want to 
protect its maritime territory and strategic port cities as global temperatures climb, but 
Vostok 2014 strikes a new chord for the international community.  The exercise was 
carried out in the middle of Siberia, far from ports or Arctic Ocean territorial claims.  In 
addition, the fact that the troop numbers involved totaled the largest number ever engaged 
in one training exercise in Russian history, especially during peacetime carries significant 
implications.  The entire operation seems to suggest Russia is preparing for a large-scale 
Arctic ground war.  This does not seem entirely far-fetched, considering the number of 
military acts undertaken by Russia that are blatantly aggressive in nature.  
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Acts of Overt Military Aggression: 
 Arctic states have claimed serious reports of overt aggression involving Russian 
military submarines and jets.  Some of the most alarming cases of this aggression within 
the last four years alone are as follows: 
March 2013: Russia carries out a mock nuclear attack on Sweden, according to a 
NATO report.44 
Late July-early August, 2014: Over a period of ten days, Russian nuclear 
bombers escorted by fighter jets fly very close to Canadian and American airspace 
around Alaska sixteen times. Some US military officials see echoes of the Cold 
War in the operations.45  
Early September, 2014: Russian strategic bombers in the Labrador Sea near 
Canada practice cruise missile strikes on the United States; at the same time, a 
NATO summit was in progress.46 
September 5, 2014: An Estonian security service operative is abducted by 
Russian agents from an Estonian border facility.47 
September 17, 2014: American and Canadian air forces scramble jets to intercept 
Russian aircraft, six near the Alaskan coast, and 2 long-range bombers over the 
Beaufort Sea near the Canadian coast.48 
                                                          
44 Armin Rosen, “US admiral: Russia's submarine activity in the North Atlantic is at Cold War levels, but 
we don't know why,” Business Insider, last modified February 5, 2016, 
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October 2014: Sweden reports an incursion of a Russian submarine into Swedish 
territorial waters.49 
November, 2014: An increased presence of Russian submarines is discovered by 
NATO in the North Atlantic, the exact location Russian subs based out of the 
Kola Peninsula frequented during the Cold War.50 
2014-2015: NATO’s Baltic Air Police scramble a record number of jets to deal 
with incoming Russian aircraft over the course of a year.51 
July 4, 2015: Two Russian Tu-95 bombers are intercepted off the southern coast 
of Alaska; Air Force veteran and US Congressman Adam Kinzinger calls the 
event an “act of aggression” intended to showcase Russian power.52 
 The above list of Russian military incursions show an obviously aggressive 
posture in the Arctic.  We must bear in mind that these incursions only have to do with 
the Arctic and Russian Arctic policy.  However, there have been countless other instances 
of Russian aggression within the same time span outside the Arctic.  We can see 
examples in places such as Ukraine, the Black Sea, Syria, and coastal waters all across 
the world.  
 It can be argued that some of these occurrences are not purposely meant to be 
aggressive, and that Russia is simply exercising its sovereign right to protect the territory 
it has claimed.  This may hold some truth, but if we consider existing forms of global 
governance, Russia’s actions are inappropriate, and run contrary to international 
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agreements that have been made thus far.  As noted earlier, UNCLOS III is a mechanism 
designed to establish the legality of international maritime claims.  It is a UN-sanctioned 
document accepted by a majority of UN Member States.  Therefore, the treaty provides 
guidelines for international conduct on the seas, and it clearly stipulates the amount of 
maritime territory states can claim.  Nowhere in the treaty is it mentioned that a state can 
claim seabed simply by placing the state’s flag on the ocean floor in that area.  Because 
Russia did exactly that illustrates the inappropriate and bold way in which the Federation 
goes about foreign policy.  
 Additionally and more alarmingly, Russia’s overt acts of aggression go directly 
against the mandate of the Arctic Council.  Considering especially the mock attack of 
Sweden in 2013 and the subsequent incursion of Russian military submarines in Swedish 
waters, Russia has undermined the credibility of the Arctic Council.  In staging a military 
drill against a fellow Council Member, the Russian Federation has shown that though the 
Council’s goal is to serve as a forum for debate, it does not have the ability to prevent 
Member States from provoking others militarily.  As noted previously, the Council’s 
mandate according to the Ottawa Declaration forbids discussion of military issues among 
Arctic states.  Therefore, though the Council may pride itself in fostering fruitful 
discussion about Arctic environmental sustainability and the rights of native peoples, its 
inability to serve as a productive mechanism to resolve military issues is its downfall; 
regardless of what it accomplishes on other fronts, it has allowed Russia to take 
advantage of the absence of a clause about military security.  Furthermore, Russia is 
exploiting that lacuna as it sees fit.  
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 Russia’s military actions in the Arctic poses a threat to the U.S., its NATO allies, 
and western powers that sympathize with NATO’s cause, but what is the Russian 
Federation’s justification for its acts of aggression?  We can agree that in order to hold 
control of Arctic resources, power projection is necessary.  The Russian military can be 
used as a mechanism to ensure this control and allow for Russia to develop an increased 
efficiency in harvesting resources without fear of intervention by other Arctic states.  
Deputy Governor of the Murmansk Region, Grigory Stratiy asserts that Russia’s military 
buildup in the Arctic does not have a sinister purpose, saying “There's no reason to be 
afraid I can reassure you.”53  However, whether this statement was meant to be actually 
reassuring or simply an effort to deflect NATO uneasiness, Russia’s militarization has no 
less caused the international community to be on guard.  This may address the purpose of 
Russian militarization, but Vladimir Putin elaborated on the Russia’s purpose in the 
Arctic overall, taking a much bolder stance than Stratiy.  The Russian president has said: 
“Over decades… Russia has built up, strengthened its positions in the Arctic… and 
our goal is not only to regain them, but also to qualitatively strengthen them.”54  
Countering Stratiy’s statement and acknowledging Putin’s direct tone, Alaska Senator 
Dan Sullivan has said “If Russia continues to invade other nations, to act aggressively to 
the United States, there's not going to be good relationships, including in the Arctic. If 
they're acting more cooperatively, then there are opportunities there.”55  Obviously, 
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policy makers on both sides are not seeing eye-to-eye when it comes to the purpose of the 
Arctic and how to cooperate with one another.   
American National Security Interests 
As explained above, Russia’s actions have alarmed U.S. officials.  Besides the 
obvious military threat the Russian Federation poses to American national security, there 
is significant benefit the region itself can bring to the United States.  There are several 
key reasons that the United States is interested in the Arctic, all of which stem from the 
race for resources that has developed between members of the Arctic Council.  As 
discussed, the Russian Federation has taken to claiming vast areas of seabed in Arctic 
waters.  Russia has laid claim to the Sea of Okhotsk, the body of water surrounded by 
Kamchatka, the Kuril Islands, and mainland Russia, as we have seen.  The Russian 
addition of the Sea of Okhotsk allows Russia access to the fuel reserves under the seabed, 
meaning that neither the United States nor any other state aside from Russia may harvest 
these reserves.   
To compete with the Russian drive to acquire Arctic oil, the United States is 
interested in claiming the remaining Arctic oil fields. In 2008, the United States 
Department of the Interior sold $2.6 billion worth of oil bids in the Chukchi Sea, north of 
the Bering Strait.   This bid emphasizes the desire for the U.S. to become a more 
prominent player in the world oil market.  Should the U.S. gain access to larger areas of 
the Arctic Ocean, the payoffs in oil could be very significant.  It is estimated that the 
Arctic region contains close to 160 billion barrels of oil – 13% of the world’s total 
undiscovered supply.  This is enough oil to keep up with global demand for the next five 
and half years.  Therefore, the more Arctic oil reserves the United States is able to secure, 
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the larger share of 160 billion barrels the nation could sell for revenue.  This could help 
the United States to shift away from being dependent on foreign oil and closer toward 
being a leading oil producer, which would greatly improve the American economy. 
Oil and natural gas reserves aside, the United States’ reasons for getting involved 
in the Arctic also involve militarization.  As previously demonstrated, six other states 
maintain military facilities in the Arctic region, most notably and most threateningly 
among these being Russia.  Although the Arctic Council might reduce the chances that a 
conflict will erupt in the region, Russian military presence and suspicious remilitarization 
of previously abandoned facilities poses serious concern to the United States and calls for 
strengthening of defense.  With all of the recent signs of Russian military escalation, and 
with a mandate by the U.S. Congress to increase military spending in the Arctic, it seems 
only logical to increase the U.S.’s military presence in the Arctic to keep up with 
Russia’s militarization and thereby maintain security in the Far North.  This conclusion 
has been reached by the U.S. government. 
Considering that the Defense Department’s approved budget for the 2015 fiscal 
year devoted most of the funds to facilities sustainment, maintenance, repair, and 
modernization ($5.5 billion for all branches combined), it is evident that the United States 
believes modernization to be essential as the Arctic ice melts.56  This is reinforced by the 
fact that “in the 2016 defense bill, the US Congress tasked the Department of Defense to 
draw up a strategic plan for defending US national security interests in the Arctic.”57  
This came soon after Russia renovated old Arctic military bases and it shows that the 
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Arctic has been recognized and prioritized by Congress to deserve special treatment in 
allocating funds for defense.  Obviously, U.S. policy makers perceive Russian 
militarization in the Arctic as a threat and are attempting to counter it.  The table on the 
following page details the number of ships and military personnel that each of the 
Member States of the Arctic Council operates above the Arctic Circle. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Mackowiak 33 
 
= Military Personne     = Warships  = Submarines       = Icebeakers 
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 As we can see, the United States’ military presence in the Arctic stacks up rather 
well compared to the other Arctic Council members in troop numbers, but is somewhat 
lagging in naval vessels compared to the likes of Canada, Norway, Russia, and even 
Denmark.  We can see an obvious power imbalance favoring Canada, Norway, Russia, 
and the United States.  It again is logical that Canada and Russia should be leading in 
Arctic military power projection: Canada’s many Arctic waterways would yield large 
numbers of naval vessels and Russia’s sheer territorial size would allow for a similar 
buildup.  Norway seems to be unique, as a state which is significantly smaller than the 
other three in comparison, yet boasts the same number of personnel, fourteen times as 
many destroyers and six Arctic submarines against no American submarines.  The United 
States, though deficient in naval power, possesses twice the number of personnel in the 
area than Russia.  This is significant because the amount of Arctic territory in the United 
States is confined only to the northernmost reaches of Alaska; Russia controls vastly 
more Arctic territory.  This is evidence of a strong military reaction by the United States 
to Russia’s bold military moves in the area.  If we consider the numbers, we can infer 
what has already happened and will continue to happen in the Arctic in the coming years: 
military escalation.  
Due to the recommendation by Congress to allocate more defense funds to the 
Arctic, these figures will most likely rise within the next few years.  The Arctic Council 
thankfully provides a forum for the members to discuss such issues, but should military 
escalation in the Arctic continue, this may lead to conflict.  Undoubtedly, the U.S. 
military is a significant force in the Arctic, but should escalation continue, the possibility 
of armed conflict poses a threat to U.S. national security.  It seems that with no proper 
Mackowiak 35 
 
system to mitigate military escalation in the Arctic, one false or aggressive step could 
light the growing Arctic powder keg.  
Aside from data presented in the table, there have also been examples of 
preparation for Arctic conflict among nations wary of Russia’s moves.  Perhaps the 
reason Norway and the United States have positioned so many personnel in the Arctic has 
to do with recent military drills.  We are now familiar with Russia’s aggressive 
militarization of the Arctic, but we can also now examine specific examples of attempts 
to counter it.  
A not-yet-released Department of Defense strategy for maintaining security in the 
Arctic called “O Plan,” according to Senator Dan Sullivan “mentions Russia at least 25 
times; there’s an entire section on Russia, and importantly, it acknowledges a common 
threat in the Arctic.”59  That the threat is the Russian Federation seems to be no secret to 
other Arctic Council members: Norway and the United States have begun exercises in the 
case of an Arctic war brought on by Russian aggression.    
 This past winter, 300 U.S. Marines were welcomed to a base in northern Norway.  
The soldiers had been training with the Norwegian military for three weeks of 
preparation, involving M1A1 Abrams tanks and realistic simulations of capturing enemy 
territory in the snow.60  Additionally, the joint forces have established pre-positioned 
tanks and weaponry in underground caves, the end goal to set up a deterrent for Putin’s 
Arctic moves.  Should Russia make aggressive advances toward Norwegian territory, the 
artillery will be moved into a defensive position, demonstrating an unyielding attitude.  
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Interestingly enough, as the Norwegian-American training exercises were underway, 
several unidentified drones were spotted in the air over the militaries’ positions.61  
Though suspicious, it has not been confirmed if any of the drones came from the Russian 
Federation.  However, the situation demands a strong degree of attention, as it shows that 
both the Russian and western militaries take the Arctic military buildup very seriously.  
Further, such preparation suggests a precarious scenario for U.S. policy makers that 
national security could be threatened by a hot war in the Far North.  
 We have seen that in response to Russia, the United States Department of Defense 
has placed a higher priority on funding Arctic military ventures.  We have discussed the 
fact that bold Russian moves in the area threaten our access to Arctic resources, and we 
have seen how this is leading to further escalation in the form of U.S. military 
involvement in another sovereign territory near the western Russian border.  All of this 
threatens the security of the United States.  Should the threat remain, and indeed should it 
become worse, there are serious implications not only for the United States, but also for 
the international community.  
Implications of an Arctic Security Threat 
 With drastic militarization, territorial claims, and bids for underwater oil fields, 
the United States’ place in the Arctic is somewhat uncertain but may be clarified when 
the current Arctic political climate is considered.  Increased Russian militarization of the 
area will bring increased American militarization.  Similar to Cold-War-Era escalation, 
both the Russian and NATO militaries will attempt to offset one another, as evidenced by 
the 2015 defense budget proposal.  Forgotten military bases will be reinvigorated and 
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hold new importance for Arctic defense.  As discussed in regards to the Russian base at 
Alakurtti, American bases in the north will undergo modernization to offset Russia’s 
military monopoly.  One key American base that may see drastic change is Thule Air 
Force Base.    
On the frozen coast of north-western Greenland, Thule Air Base is the most 
isolated US military facility, located at the halfway point between New York City and 
Moscow.  It is a joint facility between the United States and Denmark, and since the end 
of the Cold War, Thule has been last on the priority list of facilities scheduled to be 
modernized. However, since last year, this has changed dramatically.  At the height of the 
Cold War, the base served as a location from which to launch a possible air attack against 
the Soviet Union should the situation arise. Although only 1,000 troops are currently 
stationed at Thule, the facility has the capacity to hold 10,000.62    
63 
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 The above map shows Thule’s location relative to the rest of the United States and 
to the rest of the Arctic.  The base is one of the only locations in the world specifically 
designated for cooperation with NASA and to serve as an early warning radar station for 
ballistic missiles traveling through Arctic airspace.64  Though it has not needed to serve 
this purpose since the height of the Cold War, Russian developments could call for more 
personnel and resources to be stationed at Thule.  Russia’s modernization and 
reoccupation of Cold War air bases brings with it the capability for the state to use these 
bases as stations for nuclear weapons, including Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles 
(ICBMs).  Due to this possibility, the United States and its NATO allies may want to take 
security measures to ensure that the northern frontier is adequately defended, meaning 
that Thule would need to be reinforced with updated missile tracking systems.  ICBMs 
pose a significant threat to all states, and the fact that Thule could lie so close to Russian 
nuclear bases makes it a perfect location for ICBM defense.  This, in addition to possible 
troop influxes to the Arctic could mean that Thule Air Base may become one of the 
United States’ most strategically important military facilities within the next five years.   
Aside from the increased importance for strategic base location, massive 
technological development is necessary to adjust for a technological imbalance in the 
Arctic for the U.S. to assert dominance over oil and natural gas fields that are rightly 
within our waters according to UNCLOS III.  Therefore, U.S. involvement in the Arctic 
will involve increased construction of icebreakers.  The American Outer Continental 
Shelf (OCS) that determines the United States legal maritime territory off of its coast 
must be accurately mapped, so that the U.S. can legally stake a claim in the Arctic in 
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accordance with the treaty.  Currently, the U.S. relies on its allies in NATO (mainly 
Canada) to map the ocean floor north of Alaska65 in order to ascertain how deep the 
water is when drilling for oil.  Icebreakers are used to complete this task, which have 
been successful for the Russians, who have successfully mapped much of the Arctic 
Ocean for the Russian Federation.66  To catch up in the race, it is necessary for the United 
States to construct more icebreakers to map the Arctic Ocean floor with its own ships, 
which will allow for faster results and a more efficient way of harvesting resources.  Our 
natural resource security depends on our ability to gain Arctic oil and natural gas.   
Though Canada and the U.S. currently work together to survey the Arctic shelf, 
the two continue to dispute how to divide the Beaufort Sea and the Northwest Passage, 
causing a strain in relations, according to the CIA.67  This strain could make Canada less 
willing to share information on mapping of the continental shelf, emphasizing the point 
that the United States must increase production of Arctic icebreakers.  If the Outer 
Continental Shelf is accurately mapped, the United States will be able to submit its claim 
to the United Nations like every other player in the Arctic.68  The members of the Arctic 
Council are also trying to stake claims based on the extent of their continental shelf, so 
the sooner the United States can do the same, the better for the U.S. defense of its rightful 
territory.  Because of this, the future will likely see increased construction of American 
icebreakers.  
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Should the U.S. fail to accomplish these tasks, the consequences could be dire.  
One dramatic, yet feasible possibility that could result from unchallenged Russian 
expansion and aggression could be further acquisition of territory.  Recently, a series of 
maps from July 2012 resurfaced in a Moscow-based newspaper.  The maps were detailed 
predictions of Russian territorial grabs that would result in a very different-looking world 
by the year 2035.  The maps involved not only Ukraine and Eastern Europe, but also 
territories in the Arctic.69  Although doubtful to be a serious Russian foreign policy plan, 
the maps cannot be dismissed, considering Russia’s latest territorial grabs.  The plans 
detail how control of eastern Ukraine and then northern Europe and the Arctic region will 
lead to a disintegration of the European Union, and Russian dominance in Europe.  It also 
mentioned that Russia would then move on to claim the area known as “New Russia,” 
along the northern Black Sea coastline.  The significance of this plan is that much of it 
has actually come to fruition within the last two years.  The maps were released in 2012 
and depicted the Crimean Peninsula and the Donbas region as being controlled by the 
Russian Federation, two years before the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict turned these very 
areas into warzones.  Could this simply be a natural result of Russian nationalism or do 
the maps hold legitimacy for the future of the Arctic as well?  2035 is still a long way off, 
but if Russia continues its expansionist policies in the Arctic, the world map as described 
in the Moscow newspaper may become a reality.  Though it may be purely conjecture, 
we must consider every possible outcome.  
Conclusion 
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The United States faces threats from all sides, from the Middle East to our 
southern border.  Non-state actors continue to play a significant role in how we conduct 
our defense policies and military engagements, but a quieter, yet serious and long-term 
threat is looming around the North Pole.  Increases in global temperatures have made the 
Arctic more accessible than ever, opening the door to vast resource reserves, shipping 
lanes, and a chance to demonstrate military clout.  Russia’s aggressive policy in the 
Arctic is definitely cause for alarm: it will lead to a disparity in resources, causing the 
United States to fall behind in the race for Arctic oil.  It will cause Russia to become an 
Arctic hegemon, and will likely spark military escalation to occupy Arctic territory and 
military bases.  All of these things pose a threat to American national security.  UNCLOS 
III and the Arctic Council are useful attempts by the international community to maintain 
Arctic governance, but as we have seen, the boldness of Russian expansion tests the 
limits of these institutions.  In contrast with other nations, Russia is seizing on the 
opening of the Arctic to project power, and the United States must respond to this 
challenge.   
 Although the heart of this threat stems from global climate change, the United 
States must adapt to the changing security environment in the Far North.  American 
values, the way of life, and institutions are also at stake due to Russia’s Arctic moves.  
States are becoming increasingly involved in the Arctic, and if the United States is 
unwilling to recognize what could be the negative effects of this, U.S. dominance could 
be overturned.  American national security interests in the Arctic must be revisited and 
reconsidered in order to see the broader implications that climate change and the Russo-
American rivalry carry for American policy.   
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Russia is a serious threat and the United States must understand how to 
diplomatically manage relations with the Federation while showcasing U.S. military 
capability at the same time.  It is important to avoid a military confrontation with Russia 
if possible, and demonstrating a strong military capability can deter provocative actions 
by Russia in the north.  As with any issue of national security, the smallest geopolitical or 
natural changes can have significant impact on state security, and melting Arctic ice 
proves to be no different.  It is in the best interest of the United States to deal with this 
threat as soon as possible.  
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